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Abstract
One of the principal ways nations are responding to the COVID-19 pandemic is by locking
down portions of their economies to reduce infectious spread. This is expensive in terms of
lost jobs, lost economic productivity, and lost freedoms. So it is of interest to ask: What is
the optimal intensity with which to lockdown, and how should that intensity vary dynamically
over the course of an epidemic? This paper explores such questions with an optimal control
model that recognizes the particular risks when infection rates surge beyond the healthcare
system’s capacity to deliver appropriate care. The analysis shows that four broad strategies can
be optimal, ranging from brief lockdowns that only “smooth the curve” to sustained lockdowns
that prevent infections from spiking beyond the healthcare system’s capacity. Within this model,
it can be optimal to have two separate periods of locking down, so returning to a lockdown after
initial restrictions have been lifted is not necessarily a sign of failure. Relatively small changes
in judgments about how to balance health and economic harms can alter dramatically which
strategy is optimal. Indeed, there are constellations of parameters for which two or even three of
these distinct strategies can all be optimal for the same set of initial conditions; these correspond
to so-called triple Skiba points. The performance of trajectories can be highly nonlinear in the
state variables, such that for various times t, the optimal unemployment rate could be low,
medium, or high, but not anywhere in between. These complex dynamics emerge naturally
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from modeling the COVID-19 epidemic and suggest a degree of humility in policy debates.
Even people who share a common understanding of the problem’s economics and epidemiology
can prefer dramatically different policies. Conversely, favoring very different policies is not
evidence that there are fundamental disagreements.
Keywords: COVID-19, Lockdown, Skiba threshold, SIR model, optimal control
JEL codes: C61, I15
1. Introduction
A central strategy for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic is “locking down” parts of the
economy to reduce social interaction and, hence, contagious transmission. Multiple countries
have started aggressively, locking down all but essential services such as healthcare and public
safety, and then gradually re-opened increasing shares of the economy. Some have then seen
infection rates rebound and returned to a more stringent lockdown. Some places have also seen
such widespread infection that a nontrivial proportion of the population has passed through
infection to reach a “recovered state”, although there is uncertainty as to whether the resulting
immunity is brief (as with seasonal flu) or long-lasting (as with chicken pox).
All of these considerations raise the challenging question of what is the optimal degree to
which a country should lock down, and how that intensity should vary as the state of the epi-
demic evolves. We try to address that problem with an optimal control model. The heart of
the model is a classic SIR or Susceptible-Infected-Recovered differential equation model, but it
is enhanced in multiple ways. For example, the lethality of the infection varies depending on
whether there are so many infections that critical care capacity has been swamped. The most
fundamental extension, though, is creating an objective function that balances four considera-
tions: (1) Health harms (primarily COVID-related deaths), (2) Economic harm (primarily from
unemployment), and (3) Adjustment costs, meaning that sharp oscillations in the intensity of
the lockdown are costly because it becomes hard for people and businesses to constantly have
to adapt to changing rules.
Although businesses can be shut down quickly, re-opening is not as easy; policy makers
cannot just order by fiat all businesses to return to their previous levels of employment. So
the level of employment or economic activity is treated as a state variable, and the control is
adjustments to that level, with asymmetric costs reflecting that it is easier to destroy than to
create jobs. Another innovation is that public discontent with the duration and intensity of the
lockdown is represented by a fifth state variable that can enter the objective function directly
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and also modulates compliance with social distancing demands and, hence, the rate of infection.
The solutions are complex and span a range of qualitatively different strategies, such as
locking down sufficiently long and forcefully to drive infection rates down to low levels and, at
the other extreme, locking down only sparingly to merely soften the peak of infections, without
truly sparing most of the public from infection. Which strategy wins – in the sense of delivering
the lowest overall total cost – depends on the various parameter values in predictable ways,
but there are constellations of parameters for which two qualitatively different strategies may
perform equally well, even though they are very different. These tipping points have been
variously called Skiba, Sethi-Skiba, DNS, and DNSS points to celebrate the contributions of
various pioneers in the field.
Interestingly in this model there are not only conventional Skiba points separating two
alternate optimal strategies, but also “triple Skiba points” separating three different equally
appealing strategies, and even instances in which there are multiple triple Skiba points in the
same bifurcation diagram.
Importantly, there are Skiba thresholds depending on parameters that are either not known
scientifically or that reflect value judgments (such as how to trade off saving lives with creating
jobs). Hence, one meta-message of this analysis is that when two countries or two people
favor sharply different policies, that does not imply that they must have sharply different
understandings of the disease, its contagious spread, or even the extent of economic dislocation
lockdowns create. Preferences for sharply different policies does not imply there need be sharp
disagreements. Conversely, a degree of humility and generosity may be appropriate when talking
with people who favor very different policies.
This even extends to the number of lockdowns. There are optimal solutions that involve
locking down, ending the lockdown and reinstituting it. Hence, if a country endures a second
lockdown, that cannot be taken as proof that the first lockdown “failed”, or that policymakers
made mistakes.
There is now a growing literature on COVID-19 and its economic consequences as it is re-
lated to extended periods of economic lockdown. So far, only a few papers have investigated the
optimal timing, length and extent of the lockdown itself. Starting from the simple epidemiolog-
ical SIR model, Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2020) investigate the optimal lockdown intensity
and duration taking into account the tradeoff between health and economic consequences of
the lockdown itself. Alvarez et al. (2020) similarly employ a standard SIR model where they
control the fraction of the population going into lockdown. The model is derived with and
3
without testing as a control variable. If testing is included, the optimal lockdown in the US
should be started one week after the outbreak of the virus and relaxed after one month. The
absence of testing shortens the optimal length of the lockdown, which is due to the dynamics
of the epidemiology, i.e. the fraction of recovered people over time increases, implying that the
efficiency of the lockdown decreases since also recovered people are locked down.
Ko¨hler et al. (2020) analyze the impact of measures like social distancing which reduce the
infection rate. The paper distinguishes between different groups of infected, and assumes that
the mortality rate depends on the capacity of the health system. The objective is to minimize the
number of fatalities, but the authors take the societal and economic costs of the policy measures
into account by means of requiring these costs not to exceed the costs of some baseline policy.
To handle uncertainties, they promote a model predictive control based feedback strategy where
the policy measures are updated at discrete points in time.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) allow the intensity of lockdown to differ by different age-groups,
distinguishing between “young”, “middle-aged” and “old” populations, in a SIR model. It can
be shown that differentiated policy measures significantly outperform optimal uniform policies.
The gains can be realized by having stricter policies on the oldest age-group. Aspri et al. (2020)
extends a SEIRD model, where the population is divided into susceptibles, exposed, infected,
recovered and deceased, by an asymptomatic population compartment and obtain multiple
lockdowns as well as Skiba points.
We expand these previous attempts to model the optimal strategy of lockdowns by three
novel features. First, in the balance of economic and health consequences during a lockdown,
we consider a capacity constraint in the intensive care units of the health care system. If
the number of infected needing intensive care exceeds the constraint the death rate of these
patients increases. Second, we explicitly model the “memory of lockdowns” by an additional
state variable that accumulates the intensity and length of the lockdown. This “memory of
lockdowns” affects the efficiency of the lockdown and accounts for the fact that people get fed
up from long and drastic lockdowns. Third, we assume that adjusting the lockdown is costly.
In particular, we allow for an asymmetry in the costs for strengthening and weakening the
lockdown.
There is likewise a celebrated history of papers exploring Skiba thresholds (see Grass et al.
(2008), Sethi (2019)). Our paper belongs to this stream of literature, because in different scenar-
ios Skiba points occur. Comparable bifurcation analyses as in our paper can be found in Grass
(2012) and Kiseleva and Wagener (2010, 2015). However, in addition to these contributions,
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we found triple Skiba points and even multiple triple Skiba points for specific parameter con-
stellations. The first triple Skiba point was found when solving the two-state intensity splitting
production/inventory model in Steindl and Feichtinger (2004). Zeiler et al. (2011) is another
example where a solution with a triple Skiba point occurs. However, both of these contributions
consider optimal control models with infinite time horizon, whereas in our framework the time
horizon is finite. In that sense the model of Caulkins et al. (2015) is more related, but there
just Skiba points in the usual sense, i.e. separating “only” two different solutions with equal
objective value, occur.
We proceed by introducing the model. Section 3 presents the numerical results for the base
case parameters and provides an in-depth discussion of the implications of triple Skiba points.
In Section 4 the results are discussed and Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Lockdowns
A lockdown reduces interaction among people by closing down businesses and restricting
social interaction (e.g., preventing families from visiting loved ones in nursing homes). We
do not distinguish between business-related and non-business restrictions and so effectively
assume that they move together. If the rate of infection and other factors point to severe [mild]
restrictions on business, then one would expect greater [lesser] restrictions on personal social
interactions.
We define γ(t) to be the actual number of people working as a proportion of those who would
normally be working, so apart from COVID we would have γ(t) = 1. As soon as the lockdown
starts, γ(t) will drop below 1, which hurts the economy, but reduces social interactions and,
hence, the rate of new infections, in a manner described below.
Note that γ(t) is modeled as a state variable, not a control, for three reasons. First, outside
of a command-and-control state-run economy, policy makers do not get to choose directly the
level of employment. Second, adjusting the level of employment takes time and is costly. If
a country that has shut down its auto manufacturing supply chain permits that supply chain
to reopen, it will take time to reestablish connections (e.g., because some suppliers may have
gone bankrupt) and could even require some sort of fiscal stimulus to “prime the pump” in the
Keynesian sense of the term. We allow these costs to be asymmetric; it may well be easier to
shut down industries than to restart them.
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Third, and related, the final value of γ(t) at the model’s terminal time T (when a vaccine
renders lockdowns moot) enters into the salvage value function. The reasons is that if two
solutions rack up identical costs over the time period (0, T ) but one reaches time T with its
economy intact (i.e., γ(T ) is close to 1) and the other reaches time T in the midst of a deep
recession (γ(T ) well below 1), then the first solution should be preferred. This salvage function
reflects the hang-over effect of economic damage that extends beyond the period when the
infection’s dynamics are relevant. If γ(t) and, hence, γ(T ), were a control variable, then the
optimal solution would always choose to discontinuously jump γ(t) to 1 at time T to magically
make the long-run costs of the lockdown-induced dislocation disappear.
Hence, we let the change in the employment ratio u(t) be a control variable that has adjust-
ment costs, and add a state equation
γ˙(t) = u(t), γ(0) = 1,
which reflects a pre-COVID situation with γ(0) = 1.
We include a state constraint that
γ(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
since an economy having more than 100% employment makes no sense.
2.2. Lockdown fatigue
People are not robots, and the effectiveness of policies restricting activities depends, in
part, on the public’s level of cooperation and their dedication to public health protocols. A
country could restrict restaurants to take-out service, but if the kitchen workers refuse to wear
masks, wash hands frequently, or maintain social distancing during break times then some of
the potential benefits will not be realized.
Our sense is that in many jurisdictions the public’s tolerance for restrictions begins to wane
the more restrictive is the lockdown, and the longer it lasts. So the lockdown’s effect on virus
transmission depends not only on the instantaneous value of γ(t), but also on some accumulated
memory of how burdensome the lockdown has been up until time t.
The state variable z(t) captures this “lockdown fatigue” through a standard accumulation
stock dynamic that is driven by the rate of COVID-induced unemployment. Since γ(t) measures
the proportion who are employed, 1− γ(t) is the proportion who are unemployed. Hence,
z˙(t) = κ1 (1− γ(t))− κ2z(t).
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where κ1 governs the rate of accumulation of fatigue and κ2 measures its rate of exponential
decay. Note that if the worst imaginable lockdown (γ(t) = 0) lasted forever then z would grow
to its maximum possible value of zmax = κ1/κ2.
The foundation of our epidemic model is the standard SIR or Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
structure. In it, new infections are proportional to the number of susceptible people, the propor-
tion of people they meet who are infectious, and a proportionality factor β(t), which encompasses
both the number of interactions and the likelihood that an interaction produces an infection.
Numbers of interactions can be reduced by shutting down business and by adaptations on the
consumer side; e.g., only going to the grocery store once every two weeks instead of every week.
The likelihood of infection given an interaction is affected by things like mask wearing, hand
washing, and remaining at least two meters apart during an interaction.
The function β(z(t), γ(t)) should be convex in γ(t) because the first businesses that are
closed are the ones whose activities generate the most infections per unit of employment or
economic value. E.g., a society could be expected to first forbid concerts and other large public
gatherings, then socializing in bars and dine-in restaurants, and then, if the need is great
enough, to shut down manufacturing, construction, and other non-essential workplaces that do
not involve direct interaction with the public.
β := β(z, γ), βγ > 0, βγγ ≥ 0, βz > 0, β(1, 0) = β¯,
where β¯ stands for the rate of social interaction in pre-COVID times.
In the absence of lockdown fatigue, we might model β as some minimum level of infection
risk β1 that is produced just by essential activities (providing healthcare, food, and emergency
services) plus an increment β2 that is proportional to γ(t) raised to an exponent θ that is greater
than one to achieve the convexity.
We model the dependence of β on z and γ as follows:
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γθ + f
κ2
κ1
z(1− γθ)
)
.
For its properties see Appendix A.
This expression can be interpreted as follows. The term κ2κ1 z(t) is the lockdown fatigue
expressed as percentage of its maximum possible value. So if f = 1 and z(t) reached its
maximum value, then all of the potential benefits of locking down and pushing γ(t) below
1.0 would be negated. In reality, the lockdown fatigue will not reach its maximum and we
choose a relatively small value of f = 0.05, so this attenuation of the lockdowns benefit by
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lockdown fatigue has a quite modest force in the analysis below. Nonetheless, we believe it
is important to at least acknowledge this human dimension of how a population responds to
extended lockdowns.
2.3. State dynamics
The state dynamics can then be written as
S˙(t) = νN(t)− β(z(t), γ(t))S(t)I(t)
N(t)
− µS(t) + ϕR(t) (1a)
I˙(t) = β(z(t), γ(t))
S(t)I(t)
N(t)
− (α+ µ+ µI)I(t) (1b)
R˙(t) = αI(t)− µR(t)− ϕR(t) (1c)
γ˙(t) = u(t), γ(0) = 1 (1d)
z˙(t) = κ1(1− γ(t))− κ2z(t), z(0) = 0 (1e)
γ(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (1f)
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γθ + f
κ2
κ1
z(1− γθ)
)
(1g)
where N(t) = S(t) + I(t) +R(t) is the total population.
These equations allow for births at rate ν, deaths from COVID-19 at rate µI , and deaths
from other causes at rate µ but we set those three parameters to zero because the COVID-19
epidemic is playing out over a time horizon that is short enough that births and deaths are not
greatly affecting the total population.
The equations also allow a backflow of recovered individuals back into the susceptible state
at a rate ϕ. How long acquired immunity lasts varies by disease. Immunity to smallpox was
once thought to be relatively brief (3-5 years), but is now understood to be longer. Immunity to
any specific cold rhinovirus is prolonged, but there are so many rhinoviruses that we can keep
getting colds year after year. How long immunity will last with SARS-CoV-2 virus is not known
at this time, but immunity to other corona viruses often lasts 3-5 years, so we set ϕ to 0.001 per
day in our base case, which corresponds to a mean duration of immunity of 1000/365 = 2.74
years.
2.4. Objective function
The other essential part of an optimal dynamic control model is the objective. Optimally re-
sponding to COVID-19 requires juggling three to five key considerations, depending on whether
one lumps all economic considerations together or breaks them out.
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Of course the primary consideration is health which we model as in an earlier paper, see
Caulkins et al. (2020). Deaths dominate health costs because the duration of sickness is rel-
atively short compared with diseases such as cancer, let alone dementia. An important con-
tribution of Caulkins et al. (2020) that we also include here is making the risk of death for
an infected individual depend on the population-prevalence because the healthcare system can
become swamped. In particular, if the number of infected individuals I(t) times the probability
that an infected person needs critical care p is less than the healthcare system’s capacity (Hmax)
then the death rate has one value (ξ1); otherwise it gets bumped up by an additional increment
(ξ2). Implementing that literally would require a function with a discontinuous derivative, but
as Caulkins et al. (2020) explain, it is possible to find a continuously differentiable function
which very closely approximates it. Hence, the health care cost component of the objective
function is:
Vh(I, γ) := M (ξ1pI(t) + ξ2 maxs({0, pI(t)−Hmax}, ζ))
with
maxs({0, pI −Hmax}, ζ) := 1
ζ
log
(
1 + eζ(pI−Hmax)
)
, ζ  1.
The only difference relative to our previous paper is that we have reduced the value of ξ1
since the healthcare system has developed better ways of caring for COVID-19 patients (when
its capacity to treat is not overwhelmed).
Two of the economic costs are the same as in Caulkins et al. (2020). The first is the reduction
in economic activity up until time T , when a vaccine is widely deployed. Economic activity
is modeled with a standard Cobb-Douglas form so output is proportional to the number of
workers L(t) times the proportion who are working γ(t) raised to an exponent σ that is less
than one (2/3 in our base case parameter set). Infected individuals are assumed to be too sick
to work, so L(t) = S(t) +R(t). Since the time horizon is relatively short, capital K is assumed
to be fixed, and without loss of generality is set equal to 1, meaning the units of the objective
function are a day’s economic output at full employment pre-COVID. The economic loss to
be minimized is the difference between what production would have been through time T in
the absence of COVID (TKL(0)σγ(0)σ) – which sits outside the integral over time since it is a
constant – minus the equivalent term with L(t) and γ(t) varying over time due to COVID.
The second that is the same as in Caulkins et al. (2020) is the residual loss in economic
activity after the vaccine is deployed, because it takes time for full employment to be restored.
This is the difference between economic output at time T versus time 0 multiplied by a constant
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Γ representing the restoration time. For example, if residual unemployment declined linearly
to zero over two years, then Γ would be one year (or 365 days) taking into account that over
these two years, on average residual unemployment equals half of the amount of unemployment
at time T . We use that as our base case parameter value, but note that it does not imply a
linear recovery; any shape of decay that integrated out to the equivalent of one year would be
equivalent.
The third economic term is the cost of adjusting employment γ(t). This is not the cost of
people being unemployed but rather the cost of opening or closing businesses, such as loss of
perishable inventory upon shut down and start-up costs when re-opening. As is customary we
make these quadratic in the control u(t) and allow for them to be asymmetric with different
constants for shutting down businesses cl and reopening them cr, with an extra penalty for
reopening after an extended shut down so that
Vu(u(t), γ(t)) :=

clu(t)
2 u(t) ≤ 0
cr(z(t) + 1)u(t)
2 u(t) > 0
Putting all of these elements together, the resulting optimal control model will be the fol-
lowing:
10
V (X0, u(·)) :=
∫ T
0
(Vl(L(t), γ(t))− Vh(I(t), γ(t))− Vu(u(t), γ(t))) dt
− TKL(0)σγ(0)σ − Γ (KL(0)σγ(0)σ −KL(T )σγ(T )σ)
(2a)
V ∗(X0) := max
u(·)
V (X0, u(·)) (2b)
X(t) := (S(t), I(t), R(t), γ(t), z(t)), L(t) := S(t) +R(t), N(t) := S(t) + I(t) +R(t).
(2c)
s.t. S˙(t) = νN(t)− β(γ(t))S(t)I(t)
N(t)
− µS(t) + ϕR(t) (2d)
I˙(t) = β(γ(t))
S(t)I(t)
N(t)
− (α+ µ+ µI)I(t) (2e)
R˙(t) = αI(t)− µR(t)− ϕR(t) (2f)
γ˙(t) = u(t), γ(0) = 1 (2g)
z˙(t) = κ1(1− γ(t))− κ2z(t), z(0) = 0 (2h)
γ(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2i)
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γθ + f
κ2
κ1
z(1− γθ)
)
(2j)
Vl(L(t), γ(t)) := Kγ(t)
σL(t)σ (2k)
Vh(I(t), γ(t)) := M (ξ1pI(t) + ξ2 maxs({0, pI(t)−Hmax}, ζ)) (2l)
Vu(u(t), γ(t)) :=

clu(t)
2 u(t) ≤ 0
cr(z(t) + 1)u(t)
2 u(t) > 0
(2m)
2.5. Necessary Optimality Conditions
The Hamiltonian1 is
H(X,u,Λ) = Vl(L, γ)− Vh(I, γ)− Vu(u, γ) + Λ′X˙, (3a)
= Vl(L, γ)− Vh(I, γ)− Vu(u, γ) + Λ1
(
νN − β(γ)SI
N
− µS + ϕR
)
+ Λ2
(
β(γ)
SI
N
− (α+ µ+ µI)I
)
+ Λ3 (αI − µR− ϕR) (3b)
+ Λ4u+ Λ5 (κ1(1− γ)− κ2z)
1In the subsequent we omit time argument t unless needed.
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with Λ := (Λ1,Λ2,Λ3,Λ4,Λ5) denoting the costate variables. We use the indirect adjoining
approach for the pure state constraint (2i), see Hartl et al. (1995). Therefore we define the
Lagrangian
L(X,u,Λ, ψ) := H(X,u,Λ) + ψu. (3c)
For the derivatives we find
∂
∂u
H(X,u,Λ) =

2clu+ Λ4 u ≤ 0
2cru(z + 1) + Λ4 u > 0
(3d)
∂2
∂u2
H(X,u,Λ) =

2cl u ≤ 0
2crz u > 0
(3e)
Let (X∗(·), u∗(·)) be an optimal solution. Then the Hamiltonian maximizing condition yields
for γ∗(t) < 1
u∗(t) = argmax
u
H(X∗(t), u,Λ(t)) =

−Λ4(t)
2cl
Λ4(t) ≥ 0
− Λ4(t)
2cr(z∗(t) + 1)
Λ4(t) < 0
(3f)
For z(t) > 0 the second order derivative is strictly positive and the Hamiltonian is regular. For
z(t) = 0 we find from the state dynamics (1e) that these properties only hold true if γ(t) = 1.
Due to the initial condition z(0) = 0, it holds that z(t) = 0 can only be satisfied for t ∈ [0, Ts]
with some Ts ≥ 0, which necessarily implies γ(t) = 1, t ∈ [0, Ts] and either T = Ts or γ(t) < 1
for Ts < t < Ts + ε with some ε > 0. Therefore, in order to have z(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, Ts], it has
to hold that u(t) = 0. Thus, the control value is unique and hence, the control u(·) continuous.
For the Lagrangian multiplier ψ we formally solve
∂
∂u
L(X,u,Λ, ψ) := ∂
∂u
H(X,u,Λ)|u=0 + ψ = 0
yielding
ψ = −Λ4
and
ψ˙ = −Λ˙4.
Let (X∗(·), u∗(·)) be an optimal solution. Let τi, i = 1, . . . n be connecting times 0 < τ1 < . . . <
τn < T and Is, Ie and Ix three pairwise disjoint sets with Is ∪ Ie ∪ Ix = {1, . . . , n}. These sets
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are defined as
j ∈ Is iff for some ε > 0 u(t)

< 0 τj − ε < t < τj
= 0 t = τj
> 0 τj < t < τj + ε
j ∈ Ie iff for some ε > 0 γ(t)

= 1 τj ≤ t < τj + ε
< 1 τj − ε < t < τj
j ∈ Ix iff for some ε > 0 γ(t)

= 1 τj − ε < t ≤ τj
< 1 τj < t < τj + ε.
The set Is contains the switching times for the control from being strictly positive to strictly
negative. Ie is the set of entry times and Ix the set of exit times for the state constraint.
Then there exists a costate Λ(·) being continuously differentiable for t ∈ (τi, τi+1), i =
0, . . . n with τ0 := 0 and τn+1 := T . The Lagrangian multiplier ψ(·) is piecewise continuously
differentiable. For each i ∈ Ie there exists χi ∈ R. In each interval (τi, τi+1), i = 0, . . . n the
costates Λ(·) satisfy the adjoint ODEs
Λ˙(t) = − ∂
∂X
H(X∗(t), u∗(t),Λ(t)), t ∈ (τi, τi+1), i = 0, . . . n. (4)
At the connecting times for the state, costates and Lagrangian multiplier it holds that
X(τ−i ) = X(τ
+
i ), i = 1, . . . , n
Λ(τ−j ) = Λ(τ
+
j ), j ∈ Is ∪ Ix
Λ1,2,3,5(τ
−
j ) = Λ1,2,3,5(τ
+
j ), j ∈ Ie
Λ4(τ
−
j ) = Λ4(τ
+
j )− χj , j ∈ Ie
with
χj ≥ 0, j ∈ Ie.
The Lagrangian multiplier ψ(·) satisfies the complementary slackness condition
ψ(t)(1− γ(t)) = 0
and
ψ(t) ≥ 0, τj ≤ t ≤ τj+1, j ∈ Ie or j + 1 ∈ Ix
ψ(τ+j ) = χj , j ∈ Ie.
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Additionally ψ˙(·) has to satisfy
ψ˙(t) ≤ 0, τj ≤ t ≤ τj+1, j ∈ Ie or j + 1 ∈ Ix.
For γ(T ) < 1 the costates satisfy the transversality conditions
Λ(T ) = −K ∂
∂X
L(T )σγ(T )σ
and for γ(T ) = 1 the costate Λ4 has to satisfy
Λ4(T ) = −K ∂
∂γ
L(T )σγ(T )σ + χT
with
χT ≥ 0.
Table 1 shows the base case parameter values; compare also Caulkins et al. (2020).
α β1,2 Hmax p M K Γ f κ1
1
15 0, 0.2 2× 10−4 2.25× 10−2 ∗ 1 365 0.05 0.15
κ2 σ µ ν µI ζ ξ1 ξ2 ϕ cl cr θ
0.2 23 0 0 0 5000 0.03 1 0.001 1000 5000 2
Table 1: Base case parameter values.
3. Results
3.1. Results with base case parameters
For the base case parameters in Table 1 three qualitatively different solution strategies can
be optimal depending on the value of M , which denotes the value of preventing a death due to
COVID-19. Trajectories for γ, the level of employment, are shown in panels (a), (b), and (c) of
Fig. 1.
The first regime applies for small values of M ; it has only one relatively brief lockdown early
on to dampen the intensity of the epidemic (Panel (a)). In the second regime, for intermediate
values of M , it is optimal to have two separate lockdowns, one early and another – often smaller
– later, shortly before the vaccine gets widely deployed (Panel(b)). In the third regime, with
larger values of M , there is just one lockdown, but it is sustained (Panel (c)). In this case, that
14
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Figure 1: Panels (a), (b) and (c) show solution paths for each of the three regimes which differ with respect to
the size of the social cost of a death M . On the blue part of the solution paths the value of the control u is
negative, on the green part it is positive and on the red part it is zero with the constraint γ ≤ 1 being active.
effectively drives the epidemic down to minimal levels for an extended time. We call these the
“short lockdown”, “double lockdown” and “sustained” strategies; they correspond to Regimes
I, II, and III in Fig. 2, respectively.
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Figure 2: Objective value of the optimal solution path depending on the social cost of a death M for the base
case parameters given in Table 1. There are three regimes which differ by the duration, intensity as well as the
number of lockdowns of the optimal solutions. For the values of M highlighted by a vertical black line (M = 619.4
and M = 761) two different solution paths are optimal.
Naturally, as Fig. 2 shows, the objective function value is decreasing in M ; the more costly
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a death, the less well the social planner can do. The slope is initially steep because with only
a brief initial lockdown, there are many infections, and so many deaths. Increasing the cost
per death reduces the objective function value at a steep rate. That is also true in the second
regime that has two lockdowns, implying that the total number who become infected is rather
large for that strategy as well. Only when M becomes large and it is optimal to sustain a strong
lockdown that sharply reduces deaths does the dependence of V on M become less steep.
The vertical lines in Fig. 2 passing through the kinks in V (M) are points at which two
different strategies perform equally well, which is illustrated in Fig. 3. For example, when
M = 619.4 the solid and dashed trajectories perform equally well overall, even though the
Regime I strategy limits unemployment to less than 10% whereas the Regime II approach
allows unemployment to exceed 30% at one point. Likewise, Fig. 3 Panel (b) shows two very
different trajectories that perform equally well when M = 761. The solid line is a double
lockdown strategy that is very similar to the double lockdown strategy in Fig. 3a; the dashed
line shows a sustained and radically more aggressive lockdown that suffers unemployment over
40% for more than a year but – as noted – greatly reduces infections and deaths.
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Figure 3: Optimal time paths of the the proportion of working people corresponding to the different regions
shown in Fig. 2. Panel (a) and (b) return the optimal solutions for the values of M highlighted by the vertical
black line (for (a) M = 619.4 and (b) M = 761 ).
These points at which there are alternate optimal strategies are Skiba points. From the same
initial point, two different trajectories emerge but which produce the same optimal objective
function value.
Fig. 4 shows in greater detail the consequences of following the two strategies that are
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optimal when M = 619.4. Note that both strategies involve roughly the same number of people
getting infected, but the double lockdown strategy (dashed line) starts with a larger and longer
initial lockdown; that flattens the curve considerably. With the single, small lockdown (solid
dark lines), at the epidemic’s peak a quarter of the population is infected at one time, which
would completely swamp hospital’s treatment capacity. That is, when M is small, not only does
the optimal strategy allow many people to become infected, it lets many of them get infected
at the same time, so many who need critical care cannot receive it, increasing the number of
deaths. Indeed, the epidemic’s trajectory with that strategy is not so different than it would be
with no lockdown (the light lines).
Quite a few people still become infected with the double lockdown strategy, as can be seen
by the decline in the number of susceptibles (Panel (c)) and increase in the number of Recovered
individuals (Panel (e)), but the infections are spread out over time.
Fig. 5 gives further detail contrasting the two solutions that are optimal when M = 761.
These strategies differ even more markedly, as is perhaps best seen in Panel (b), which shows
that with this sustained strategy, the infection rate never exceeds the hospital’s capacity which
is indicated by the horizontal solid line.
It is very interesting to contrast the different strategies’ variation over time in the epidemic’s
effective reproductive number (Reff), meaning the raw reproductive number modified by both
the control intervention and also the accumulation of people in the Recovered state. Both,
the two-lockdown and the sustained strategies for these parameter values keep Reff close to 1
throughout most of the time horizon.
The only exception is that the sustained strategy allows the effective reproductive rate to
increase just before the vaccine is distributed. At that point the number of infections is so low,
that even a month or two of spread does not push the absolute number of infections up very
high.
Note that strategies involving a change in policy a month or two before the vaccine is widely
deployed are not unrealistic. Although it is not possible to predict when a vaccine will be
invented, there is a lag between invention and widespread deployment during mass production
and distribution. The production and distribution stages are reasonably well-understood pro-
cesses, so their duration is fairly predictable. That means a strategy that calls for a change 30
or 60 days before the vaccine has been fully deployed is feasible.
The speed of the epidemic’s spread requires this hovering of Reff near 1.0 for any “interior”
solution with a substantial pool of susceptibles. The time from infection to end of infectiousness
17
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Figure 4: Time paths for the Skiba solutions at M = 619.4. Panel (a) depicts the control and panel (b) the
proportion of working people. Panel (c) shows the number of susceptibles, panel (d) the number of infected
(above the red horizontal line hospital capacity is exceeded), panel (e) the number of recovered patients. In panel
(f) the effective reproduction number can be seen and in panel (g) the perceived lockdown intensity z. The gray
line shows the uncontrolled epidemic’s time path.
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Figure 5: Time paths for the Skiba solution at M = 761. Panel (a) depicts the proportion of working people,
panel (b) the number of infected and panel (c) the effective reproduction number.
is short; about two weeks. So within a 52-week year, that reproductive rate can effectively get
raised to the 26th power. If it is anything other than about 1, that will cause the number of
infected individuals to vary rapidly. Regime I strategies dispense with that stability, with Reff
swinging from 3 to one-third over just three months, before rebounding to well above 1, and
that variation is driven by variation in the numbers in the susceptible and recovered states.
So in a sense, one can think of the three strategies as follows. Regime I: Let the epidemic
run its course, more or less. Regime II: Smooth out the epidemic curve with intermittent pulses
of locking down. Regime III: Use a sustained, deep lockdown to forestall the epidemic.
3.2. Triple Skiba points
The model produces rich behavior, including the possibility of a triple Skiba point from
which three distinct optimal trajectories emerge. The additional strategy at these points in-
volves a double pulse lockdown but without ending it completely in between. That is in some
sense intermediate between Regimes II and III because some degree of lockdown is maintained
throughout (as in Regime III) but there are two distinct waves of locking down (as in Regime
II).
Fig. 7 Panel (d) illustrates a typical trajectory with this new Regime IV strategy.
Fig. 6 Panel (a) shows two triple-Skiba points in a bifurcation diagram in the space of pa-
rameters M (cost of a death) and cr, which governs the adjustment costs of reopening businesses
that have been shut down. In Panel (c), which corresponds to the left-hand triple Skiba point
at cr = 75, 672.5 and M = 869, there is a standard Regime I strategy (solid line), a standard
Regime II strategy (dot-dashed line) and a new (Regime IV) type strategy (dashed line). At this
particular point, the Regime IV strategy appears only very slightly different than the Regime
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II strategy because γ comes very close to 1.0 near the end of year 1 and beginning of year 2.
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram in the M–cr space, for ϕ = 0.001, β1 = 0, β2 = 0.2 and κ1 = 0.15, κ2 = 0.2, cl =
1000, ξ1 = 0.03, ξ2 = 1 (panel (a)). The blue curves show the Skiba curves and the dots denote the triple Skiba
points (red), examples for the Skiba solutions (green) and examples for the different regions (black). Panels (b)
and (c) show the time paths of γ starting at the triple Skiba points occurring for cr = 69, 632.7,M = 883 and
cr = 75, 672.5,M = 869.
Note that it makes sense that the line dividing Regions I and II/IV slopes upward in this
bifurcation diagram. Larger values of M place greater value on reducing infection, justifying
more locking down, and smaller values of cr mean that two waves of locking down is not
prohibitive because the cost of businesses rebuilding after a lockdown is not so high (small cr).
Panel (b), which corresponds to the right-hand triple Skiba point with cr = 69, 632.7 and
M = 883, has a Regime II strategy (solid line), a Regime IV strategy (dot-dashed line), and a
Regime III near-eradication strategy (dashed line).
The upward slope of the line separating the II/IV and III regimes again makes sense. Larger
M favors a sustained lockdown, so Regime III is to the right. Also, Regime III involves a deeper
trough in employment and so a steeper rebuilding, so that option does well when reopening
shuttered industries is not too expensive (cr is small).
Fig. 8 show that it is also possible to have a triple Skiba involving trajectories from Regimes
I and III. Triple Skiba involving both Regime II & IV strategies and one other are perhaps
unsurprising; both Regimes II and IV are both in some sense double lockdown strategies. They
are distinguished in Fig. 6 only by whether the interlude between the two pulses was long enough
to allow γ to recover all the way to 1.0. That a decision maker could be indifferent between a
Regime I and III strategy (as well as one from Regime II or IV) might seem more surprising
because the Regime I and III strategies in Fig. 8 appeared to be near opposites. The Regime
I trajectory involved very little in the way of locking down and the Regime III strategy was at
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Figure 7: Time paths of γ for the four different regimes depicted in Fig. 6.
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the other extreme.
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Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram in the M–cr space, for f = 0.25 (panel (a)) and time paths of γ (panel (b)) for
solutions starting at the triple Skiba point for M = 1145.3, cr = 175904.5 depicted by a red dot in panel (a).
Fig. 9 shows how results differ if it takes three not two years to develop and deploy an
effective vaccine. The qualitative results seem little changed. In particular, the two lockdown
strategy continues to employ just two lockdowns; it did not morph into a three lockdown
strategy. Likewise, that second lockdown continues to come soon before the vaccine is deployed,
not a certain, fixed time after the first lockdown ends.
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram in the M–cr space for T = 1, 095.
22
4. Discussion
Perhaps the most basic conclusion of this analysis is that very different strategies for re-
sponding to the COVID-19 pandemic can be optimal with the exact same set of parameter
values. Exact equality of performance is a knife-edge case, occurring only exactly at the Skiba
point. However, there are neighborhoods around the Skiba points where alternate, very different
strategies perform nearly as well.
A second basic conclusion is that even when only a single strategy is optimal, which specific
strategy wins can change quickly when certain parameters values vary over a relatively limited
range. This is perhaps best illustrated with respect to M , the parameter standing for the cost
to the social planner per premature death. There is a long literature discussing what is the
appropriate value to use for that parameter in social welfare analysis. There is some common
understanding as to the order of magnitude, but considerable debate as to the particular value.
That is not surprising inasmuch as it is not an empirical constant akin to the atomic mass of an
element so much as an expression of values, and different people can have different values about
how they wish to trade-off life and health with economic outcomes (such as unemployment) and
happiness more generally (including freedom of association).
Fig. 6 shows that for our base case value of parameter cr = 5, 000 (standing for the cost of
reopening shuttered businesses), varying parameter M by less than 10% (from slightly below
800 up to 860) carries one all the way across the bifurcation diagram. When M is (a bit smaller
than) 800, one is in Regime I where it is optimal to more or less let the regime run its course.
When M is a bit larger than 800, it is optimal to have two distinct lockdowns, both lasting well
less than a year. And by the time M reaches 860, it is optimal to have one sustained lockdown
that involves a very substantial loss of employment, but also a very substantial reduction in
infection and death.
A third observation is simply that strategies involving two lockdowns can be optimal. A
number of jurisdictions that locked down then opened up are now having to reinstitute restric-
tions. For example, Israel was once in the top five highest in the world for new infections per
capita. It drove that all the way down to below 0.2 per 100,000 per day and so appeared to
have largely eliminated infections, but has recently bounced back up into the top 5 as of this
writing, with about 19 new confirmed infections per 100,000 per day. Superficially, that appears
to be a policy disaster and, indeed, Israel’s resurgence of infections may indicate policy failure
in this case; certainly Prime Minister Netanyahu is facing strident protests for his leadership on
this issue. But the model shows that the mere presence of a resurgence necessitating a second
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lockdown is not in and of itself proof of error. A double lockdown can be an optimal strategy
and part of an optimal plan from the outset.
A fourth observation concerns the Skiba points. Skiba points separate distinct optimal
solution trajectories that spread out from a common initial condition in different directions. In
a one-state problem, there would generally be one strategy that moves left and another that
moves right from that common initial condition. Yet when plotted in state space, particularly
with respect to γ, which stands for the rate of employment still permitted despite the lockdown,
the alternative trajectories here do not appear to be so sharply resolved. With respect to several
of the triple Skiba points observed here, all three optimal strategies start with a lockdown that
drives down γ, albeit with varying intensities. And in Fig. 8, in particular, the three strategies
seem all to be in the interior and on a continuum. Implicitly, if two trajectories are both optimal,
then all strategies that are “in between” must be worse. So for every point in time t, we have
the following odd situation in Fig. 8. A moderate amount of unemployment is ideal. A little
more is bad. Still more brings one back to ideal. Yet more is bad again. But still more is back
to being ideal. Not only is social welfare not a monotonic function of unemployment, at every
time t, it is a triple-peaked function.
It is worth reflecting on how peculiar this is. Imagine there were seven identical countries
that all started at the same point, and we stopped them at some time t in the middle of the
epidemic and rank ordered them from “best” to “worst” in terms of amounts of unemployment.
Having done that, every second country on that rank-ordered list could be following an optimal
policy (meaning countries #2, #4, and #6 are optimal), while every other country is not on an
optimal trajectory, even though all started in exactly the same place.
In a way, this is not altogether surprising. We have a five-state problem, so projections
onto a single state can be deceiving, and the objective function is a highly nonlinear function of
the state variables. On the other hand, all of that nonlinearity and all of those state variables
arise naturally from a modeling of the problem; this is not an artificial model constructed just
to produce curious results. It is a model that makes a good faith effort to capture the most
important dynamics of the epidemic.
One contributor to this seemingly odd behavior is the inherent instability of an epidemic
whose total time from infection to end of infectiousness is as short as 14-days. It moves through
the population very quickly. That speed forces society into one of three broad postures: (1)
High employment but also high infections, (2) High unemployment in order to achieve very
low infections, and (3) Walking a delicate balance with multiple pulses of locking down that
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tolerates a moderate amount of infection but nonetheless keeps the epidemic’s reproductive rate
close to 1.0.
So the instability of the epidemic naturally produces a standard double-Skiba point, akin to
the “eradicate vs. accommodate” options seen in past models, see Tragler et al. (2001), Grass
et al. (2008). But it is possible, at least in this model, to delicately walk a fine line in between,
that avoids the Draconian measures required for eradication but also keeps the epidemic from
massively overwhelming hospital capacity. And the feasibility – and indeed potential optimality
– of such intermediate paths is what produces the triple Skiba points and the extreme non-
monotonicity of overall performance with respect to state variables, including even the level of
unemployment.
5. Conclusion
In sum, this relatively simple model produces a wide range of interesting behaviors that are
directly interpretable in terms of the policy context. There are, as always, abundant opportu-
nities for further work and refining the model. Among its limitations at present, we mention
a few that are salient. One is not modeling and including a control for testing and contact
tracing. It may be that once the number of infections has been driven down sufficiently low,
that aggressive testing and tracing could keep the number of infections from rebounding even if
everyone went back to work. That would open up a strategy that locks down very aggressively
and for a moderately long time, but does not need to sustain the lockdown all but up to the
point at which the vaccine becomes widely deployed. That approach would enjoy the best of
both worlds – but only after a moderately long period of economic pain.
Another realistic extension would be to recognize that there are different geographic regions
with at least some degree of movement between regions. When the two regions are out of synch
in terms of their epidemics, then that movement might trigger a resurgence in a low prevalence
region with migrants from a high prevalence region. That possibility has led to very widespread
border closures and restrictions on freedom of movement that would have been unimaginable
just twelve months ago, and the likes of which have not been seen since the fall of the Soviet
Union. It would be tremendously valuable to determine whether all those border closures are
truly needed.
Another class of important extensions would be to recognize heterogeneity along at least
two dimensions. One is age. Simply put, the infection fatality rate is much, much higher for
older people, and for those with certain preexisting medical conditions, than it is for young
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healthy people. So the tradeoff between economic loss and health harm involves a very large
distributional issue. It is working age people who become unemployed and (for the most part)
retirees who reap the majority of the health benefits of that loss of income.
There is also important heterogeneity across people in terms of how active they are socially
or, in the jargon of HIV/AIDS models, how many risky acts they pursue. Some people are
naturally socially isolated even before quarantine; others are social butterflies who frequent
indoor places with much circulation of people and little recirculation of the air. Because of
stochastic selectivity, high-rate transmitters will be disproportionately over-represented among
those who get infected and recover early. That means the effective amount of herd immunity will
be greater than is reflected in this model, which treats all people as homogenous with respect
to the number of risky contacts they have per unit time.
Of course many more such extensions would be possible. So we close with a final meta-
observation. When a central policy response to a pandemic involves shutting down the economy,
there are not only complex value tradeoffs, but also complex state dynamics that provide ample
fodder for interesting optimal control modeling. Since COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last
important pandemic in our lifetimes, that suggests there may be considerable value in analyzing
models now that are inspired by COVID-19, but which do not slavishly model it exactly. Instead,
there is value in abstracting somewhat to capture the general tensions and considerations that
such pandemics create. That way we can not only deal more effectively with the current crisis,
but also be better prepared to respond to the next one.
A. Properties of the function β(γ, z)
We choose β1 and β2 such that β1 +β2 = β¯, where β¯ is the contact rate of the “uncontrolled”
epidemics and 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, θ ≥ 1.
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γθ + f
κ2
κ1
z(1− γθ)
)
(A.1a)
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yields
β(1, z) = β1 + β2 = β¯ (A.1b)
β(γ, z) > β1 + γ
θβ2, for z > 0, 0 ≤ γ < 1 (A.1c)
β(γ, 0) = β1 + γ
θβ2 (A.1d)
β(γ, z) < β¯, γ < 1 (A.1e)
∂
∂γ
β(γ, z) = β2θγ
θ−1
(
1− f κ2
κ1
z
)
> 0, γ > 0 (A.1f)
∂
∂z
β(γ, z) = β2f
κ2
κ1
(1− γθ) > 0, γ < 1 (A.1g)
Inequalities Eqs. (A.1d) to (A.1g) follow from
z(t) <
κ1
κ2
, for all t with z(0) = 0.
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